

The criterion of moral value from the perspective of the late Maleki Tabrizi

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Abstract

One of the important topics of moral philosophy is the discussion of moral value. But one of the most important discussions that must be addressed in this field is the discussion of the standard of moral value, because it acts as a guide and saves the moral agent from falling into anti-value caused by ambiguity and confusion. Whether the criterion of moral value is a single thing or multiple, and if there are multiple, are these criteria also related to each other, or is there no connection between them, is one of the issues that must be addressed. And finally addressing the issue of which of these criteria justify which of the theories. Therefore, in this research, with a descriptive-analytical approach, this issue is considered from the perspective of the late Maleki Tabrizi, due to the attention of contemporary scholars to his works. The late Maleki has a result-oriented view on the criterion of moral values and considers divine satisfaction, closeness to the supreme right and in its light, true pleasure as a criterion of value and a criterion of moral value.

Keywords: Value criterion, moral value, moral value criterion, Maleki Tabrizi

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